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remembered that the presumption favors the religious interests,93 and
unless the Commission can demonstrate some overriding state interest,
the free exercise claims must prevail.

ACT- CREDITOR
DEFINED
AND
Consumer Credit -TRUTHIN LENDING
DAMAGES
AND RESCISSION
JOINTLY
AWARDED
- Eby v . Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
In October, 1969, Betty Eby purchased a residential dwelling from
Reb Realty, Inc., for $16,700. T o finance the transaction, Eby assumed
a Veteran's Administration mortgage and executed a second mortgage in
favor of Reb Realty. Eby made subsequent payments on the first mortgage, but ultimately defaulted on both mortgages, whereupon Reb
Realty properly reentered and took possession of the property. Eby sued
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for rescission and damages based on Reb Realty's admitted nondisclosure of credit
terms and rescission rights at the time of sale as required by the Truth in
Lending Act (the Act).' Reb Realty argued that it was not a "creditor"
within the meaning of the Act and thus not subject to its provisions. Alternatively, Reb Realty contended that Eby must elect her remedies in
that she was not entitled to both rescission and damages. The district
court granted summary judgment in Eby 's favor, awarding both rescission and damages, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2

The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to enhance economic
stabilization and strengthen competition among those engaged in the
extension of consumer credit. This purpose is accomplished by disclosure of certain credit terms to those who use such credit.3 Among the
matters required to be disclosed are the annual percentage rate of interest, the total amount financed, the amount of periodic payments, and
93See text accompanying note 23 supra.
'15 U.S.C. $8 1601-65 (1970). For a general discussion of the Truth in Lending Act and
TRUTH
IN F ~ AESTATE
L
LENDING
(1970); Aldridge, Truthrelated matters see e.g., J. ABRAHAM,
in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N. CAR.L. REV. 427 (1970); Boyd, The Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act -A Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTREDAMELAW.171 (1969);
Griffith, Truth-in-lendingand Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHION.L. REV. 1
(1974); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199 (1968);
Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST.
MARY'SL.J. 37 (1974); Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24
STAN.L. Fhv. 793 (1972); Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and
Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN.L. REV.10 1 (1974).
2Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (1974). The district court opinion is not officially
reported.
315 U.S.C. $ 1601 (1970).
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a description of security interests taken.4 Failure to make these disclosures can subject a creditor to damages of double the finance charge of
the transaction.5 In addition, when residential real property is retained
as security, the creditor must disclose the consumer's-right to rescind the
transaction within 3 business days of consummation. This right of rescission is extended indefinitely if disclosure is not made.6
T o be subject to its provisions, a lender must be a "creditor" within the
meaning of the Act. This classification applies to those who arrange
credit or regularly extend credic7 but thus far the courts have not interpreted this definition as it applies to those who extend credit at irregular
intervals.8 The Eby court addressed the issue as one of first impression.
4Id. $9 1635-39. These sections contain requirements of disclosure for open end consumer
credit plans (defined at Id. 5 1602(i)),consumer sales, and other plans. See generally Aldridge,
Truth-in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N . CAR. L. REV.427, 448-49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Aldridge] ; Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law, 6 ST.
MARY'S
L.J. 37,49-62 (1 974).
515 U.S.C. 5 1640(a)(1970) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails in connection with
any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under
this part to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the
sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except
that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000;
and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the
action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
Certain defenses are also provided by this section: (1) Liability will not be imposed if correction of an error in disclosure is made within 15 days of discovery and prior to notice or institution of suit by a debtor. Under this provision a creditor must also make proper adjustments
to assure that a consumer does not pay a finance charge in excess of that actually disclosed.
Id. 1640(b). (2) Likewise, liability will not be imposed for unintentional violations of the
Act where reasonable procedures are maintained to avoid such errors. Id. 5 1640(c).
6Id. 8 1635(a) states in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction in which a security interest is retained or acquired in any real property which is
used or is expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended,
the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third
business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section and all other material disclosures required under
this part, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of
the Board, of his intention to do so.
This section is limited to second liens; the right is not available where first liens are created
or retained to finance acquisition of the consumer's personal residence. Id. 5 1635(e).
T h e effect of rescission is: (1) the consumer is no longer liable under the agreement, (2) any
security interest becomes void, and (3) the creditor must return all money and property received under the transaction. Id. § 1635(b).
' I d . § 1602(f);see note 19 infra.
8Courts have construed the definition of "creditor" insofar as it applies to an "arranger" of
credit. See Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Philbeck v.
Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d
971 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Courts have also considered whether parties are "creditors" even though no finance charge is
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The second issue in the case concerned the propriety of awarding
rescission and damages jointly. Courts have been in conflict over whether
such a joint remedy is available for a violation of the Act. When the
question was first addressed in Bostwick v. Cohen,g the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio resorted to the traditional election of remedies doctrinelo and held that rescission and damages were
both remedial in nature and could not be jointly awarded. In a subsequent case, Palmer v. Wilson,ll the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California concluded that a literal reading of
the Act would allow both remedies. By this time Bostwick had been
effectively undermined by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,12 wherein the Court
indicated that damages provided for under the Act were actually in the
nature of a "civil penalty."l3 With the Bostwick position that rescission
and damages were both remedial measures thus questioned, the Palmer
court granted both remedies.l*

In the instant case the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment holding that Reb Realty was a "creditor" within the
meaning of the Act. T h e court concluded that there were no disputed
issues of fact and that the creditor issue was neither so complex nor insufficiently highlighted as to warrant further factual elucidation. Considering definitions of a "creditor" under the Act and Regulations,15
public position letters issued by the Federal Reserve Board,l6 and legisimposed. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 41 1 U.S. 356 (1973); Rootberg v.
American Express Co., 352 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Garland v. Mobil Oil Corp., 340 F.
Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
9319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
lOThe common understanding of the election of remedies doctrine is that where an aggrieved party "has two inconsistent remedies available to him for the redress of a single right,
he must elect one of those remedies." Dobbs, Pressing Problems for the Plaintiffs h w y e r in
Rescission: Election of Remedies and Restoration of Consideration, 26 ARK.L. REV.322, 325
(1972). The author states that an analysis of consistency begs the question; the result really
depends upon whether the court believes both remedies "ought to be granted." Id. at 325 n.9.
"359 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974)
(lower court instructed to consider conditional rescission award).
12411 U.S. 356 (1973).
l31d. at 375-76.
'4359 F. Supp. at 1103, 1104; accord Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166
(D. Alas. 1971) (granting rescission and damages but not addressing the issue directly), rev'd
on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
I512 C.F.R. 8 226 (1974).
16"Public position letters" is a classification conceived and used by I1 R. CLONTZ,
TRUTH-IN. T h e correspondence
LENDING
MANUAL
E-2 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as I1 R. CLONTZ]
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lative history, the court concluded that the Act would not apply to "those
lenders whose extensions of credit are an occasional, isolated, and incidental portion of their business,"l7 but that Reb Realty's credit activities
were not so limited.
The record indicated that Reb Realty was primarily a real estate
broker arranging transactions between buyers and sellers of real property. O n seven occasions during a period of 19 months, Reb Realty sold
property on its own account. In three of these transactions Reb Realty
extended credit. On the basis of these facts the court concluded that
these credit sales were a significant aspect of Reb Realty's business and
not so isolated and incidental as to exempt Reb Realty from the Act. The
court reasoned that to hold otherwise might insulate a significant credit
market from the Act's requirements, and that real estate brokers who
deal constantly with credit would not likely be burdened or surprised by
the Act's requirements.
The court also reviewed the propriety of the lower court's award of
both rescission and damages. Recognizing that no interrelation between
the two sanctions is suggested by statute or legislative history, the court
considered but rejected the position taken by Bostwick v . Cohen that
both remedies were remedial and only one could be elected. In Mourning, the Supreme Court classified the damage section of the Act as a
penalty, which overcame the Bostwick objection that such damages were
remedial and thus inconsistent with an award of rescission. Moreover,
in the court's view, to refuse damage awards where rescission was also
granted would undermine the effectiveness of the Act. Thus the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's joint award of rescission and damages.l8 T h e court nevertheless qualified its holding by stating that both
remedies are not appropriate in all instances and that a court should
use its equitable discretion to deny one of the remedies if harshness
might result.
This note will address the two major issues that faced the circuit court
in Eby: (1) the meaning of "creditor" under the Act; and (2) the propriety of awarding both rescission and damages.
referred to is issued by the Federal Reserve Board to help solve problems arising in interpreting the Act. In 1970, letters numbered more than 1,000. Since then, approximately 852 of
these letters have been given official numbers and indexed. These official letters are repre4 CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE
at 65,951.
sentative of the best correspondence. I1 R. CLONTZ;
17495F.2d at 649.
18Zd. at 652. A review of the application of the rescission and damage sections of the Act
shows that the district court erred in determining the amount of damages that should have
been granted under the respective sections. T h e Ninth Circuit noted the possibility of error
in granting rescission of the first mortgage but refused to take notice of it. Id. at 648 n.2. Because rescission is limited to second liens, granting rescission of the first mortgage was clearly
error. As a result, Eby was awarded $601 too much in the rescission award; this amount represented payments made toward the first mortgage. See note 6 supra. See generally J . ABRAHAM, TRUTH
IN REALESTATE
LENDING
$ 14.10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABRAHAM]
;Aldridge,
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111. ANALYSIS
A . Creditors
The Truth in Lending Act defines creditors as those "who regularly
extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit. "19 Regulation 220 defines
a creditor as one who regularly extends credit "in the ordinary course of
b u ~ i n e s s . "The
~ ~ only indication of the scope of these definitions is provided by Senate and House reports of the Act explaining that the provisions were not to cover "a small retailer who extended credit . . . in an
isolated instance to accommodate a particular customer. "22
Evidence pertinent to these standards showed that Reb Realty completed three credit transactions over a period of 19 months. The second
credit transaction involved a loan of $4,200 to Eby for the purchase of
a residential dwelling. With these facts before it, the Ninth Circuit concluded that these credit transactions were not "the type of isolated and
incidental transactions the definition of creditor was meant to exempt. "23
The court's affirmation of this issue initially appears to be well
founded. In light of the Act's purpose of enhancing competition by dis~~
closure, a liberal construction of the Act's terms is a p p r ~ p r i a t e .The
broad definitions contained in the public position letters also suggest a
- -

-

supra note 4, at 448-49; Heimbuch, Real Property- Truth in Lending, 49 M I C H .B.J. Aug.,
1970, at 11, 14-15. T h e district court also miscalculated the amount of damages Eby was entitled to under the civil liability section; this mistake was apparently not noticed by the circuit
court. T h e amount awarded was $478.82- twice the interest Eby paid. According to the
applicable section, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970), see note 5 supra, Eby was entitled to twice the
finance charge of the transaction, limited to a total award of $1,000. Considering the magnitude of the transaction, $4,200 at 8 percent simple interest, conceivably Eby was entitled to the
full $1,000, not just double the interest paid. As a result of this error, the civil liability award
was probably deficient by $52 1.18.
It is hard to understand why the court did not correct these two errors. Certainly the issue
of damages was before the court. Confirmation of this result only adds confusion to the case
law under the Act.

1915 U.S.C. 8 1602(f)(1970). T h e definition in its entirety states:
T h e term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the
extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required, whether in
connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise. T h e provisions of this
subchapter apply to any such creditor, irrespective of his or its status as a natural person
or any type of organization.
20Regulation Z is the title given to the regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board to
implement the Act. 12 C.F.R. 5 226 (1974).
2l12 C.F.R. 9 226.2(m) (1974). T h e definition in its entirety states:
"Creditor" means a person who in the ordinary course of business regularly extends or
arranges for the extension of consumer credit, or offers to extend or arrange for the extension of such credit.
22H.R. REP. NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1967); S. REP. NO. 392, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1967).
23495 F.2d at 650.
24See N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973).
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liberal constr~ction.~5
Moreover, real estate brokers are not normally
considered such small retailers as Congress apparently intended to exclude from the Act. Because of the magnitude of the brokers' transactions, the benefits of informed use of credit would seem to far outweigh
the burdens of disclosure. This position presumes that brokers are constantly involved with credit matters and therefore have expertise necessary to implement the requirements of the Act.26
Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the court's application of its "occasional, isolated, and incidental" standard and in the court's assumption
that brokers are likely to be familiar with the requirements of the Truth
in Lending Act.
1. Application of standard. When the court determined that Reb
Realty's transactions were not occasional and isolated, the court did not
clearly delineate the impact of its decision. The court found Reb Realty
a "creditor" on the basis of threecredit transactions. Yet, at the time Eby
contracted with Reb Realty only one previous credit transaction had
occurred, that taking place 6 months earlier. The third credit transaction
was consummated 10 months later,Z7 2 months after Eby instituted her
suit." Clearly, the court's conclusion would have rested on a more persuasive factual foundation, if the third transaction had been challenged
rather than the second. But, the court found it sufficient to find Reb
Realty a "creditor" on two credit transactions with a third following.
This finding implies that Reb Realty may have been a "creditor" at its
very first credit transaction. This result was not made clear by the court.
Because this standard for assessing whether an individual is a
"creditor" was not made clear in the instant c a ~ e , a~ difficult
9
burden has
25Seeletters cited note 29 infra.
26495F.2d at 650.
271d.at 648.
28Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). T h e third
credit transaction may have been occasioned by the result of a default of the second credit
transaction. T h e facts in the instant case indicate that out of the seven real estate transactions,
one was necessitated by previous default. Only six lots were sold; the property involved in the
instant case was sold twice. Brief for Appellee at 3, Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1974). It is therefore possible that Eby's default of the second credit transaction induced
the third credit transaction.

29The standards set by the public position letters for determining a creditor suggest no finer
guidelines than do the statutory and regulatory definitions. One letter states that the standard
for consideration is whether the credit transaction is "extremely isolated." Federal Reserve
Board [hereinafter FRB] Letter No. 30, July 8, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.
CRED.GUIDE7 30,086. This letter was in answer to an inquiry about the applicability of the
Act to a hospital. The response indicated that allowing an account to be paid in more than
four installments in an extremely isolated instance would not bring the hospital within the
Act. A subsequent letter makes no mention as to frequency or num'bers except that exclusion
would apply when the transactions were not an "integral" part of the lender's business. Federal
Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC] Letter, August 1, 1969, [l969-19'74 Transfer Binder]
CCH CONS. CRED.GUIDE
7 30,329. The letter states that a corporation is not a creditor within
the Act when it makes incidental loans to its officers and directors. It concludes that the loans
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been imposed on lenders that make infrequent loans. They must comply
with the Act for each credit transaction even if subsequent transactions
are not presently contemplated.30 If the lender does not comply with the
Act's disclosure provisions and enters into subsequent credit transactions,
he runs the risk of a court finding him to have been a "creditor" even on
the first transaction. Therefore an occasional lender should comply with
the Act's requirements or run the risk of having its credit transactions
rescinded and damages awarded against it.
The court's conclusion that the transactions involved large amounts
of money and thus were a significant aspect of Reb Realty's business is
questionable. A single residential credit transaction by a firm that regularly handles large amounts of money may be only an "incidental portion
of [the firm's] business."31 Although the purchase of a home is generally
a major undertaking for a consumer, the sale is not necessarily a significant portion of the realtor's business. The court should have required additional facts so that a comparison of Reb's questioned transactions with its total business revenues could be made to aid in determining whether its credit extension was merely incidental in nature.
The term "portion"suggests such a comparison; this comparison can only
be made if such additional facts are kn0wn.3~From the record of the case,
were not made in the ordinary course of business, that they were not an integral part of the
corporation's operations nor in furtherance of its business purpose.
At most, the letters indicate that a lender could be exempt from the Act's mandates for
plural credit transactions, FTC Letter, August 1, 1969, [ 1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONS.CRED.GUIDE1 30,329; FRB Letter No. 30, July 8, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder]
130,086; the Board's letter cited by the court in the instant case conCCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE
templated protection from the Act for "casud isolated sales." FRB Letter No. 261, February
130,313 (emphasis added).
19, 1970, [1969-1974Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE
As a result the court may have placed too heavy a reliance on the public position letters even
though such letters are sometimes disregarded as simply one man's view. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also FRB Letter
No. 444, March 1, 1971, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE1 30,640. One
example, showing the letters' limited worth, is provided by FRB Letter No. 396, August 7,
1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE130,580. There, a letter condudes that ordinarily a dealer in real estate is a creditor within the definition of Regulation
2. T h e flaw in this conclusion is obvious. T h e definition of "dealer in real property" would
theoretically deserve the same type of analysis as does "creditor" under the Act: how many
and how frequent need transactions be to make a dealer a "dealer"? This letter was not cited
by the court although it was brought to its attention by Eby's counsel. Brief for Appellee at 5,
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). T h e court concluded that though the
letters are hardly binding, they do represent a n experienced judgment to which a court might
properly refer.
30FRB Letter No. 161, October 17, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.
130,190.
GUIDE
3l495 F.2d at 649 (emphasis added).
32An additional question raised as to the "incidental" aspect of the court's standard is
whether it is measured in monetary terms o r in terms of business activity. This type of approach would correspond much closer to a literal reading of the statutory and regulatory
definition of a "creditor." This type of analysis is suggested by a Federal Trade Commission
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then, it appears that additional evidence may have impelled the court to
a finding contrary to the one it reached. Summary judgment was improper in this case. Even if the possibility of the contrary finding were
only marginal, doubt would properly be resolved by remand for full
trial.
2. Business or private lender. In construing the definition of "creditor," the court concluded that a realtor is "likely to be familiar with the
general requirements of the Act."33 This reference to the realtor's familiarity with the Act may be an overstatement. In the majority of transactions the realtor has no obligation to disclose. First, he does not generally extend credit; rather, credit is provided by financial institutions.
Second, he does not generally arrange credit under the terms of the Act.34
Thus, the realtor is not "likely" to know the requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act.
T h e court also concluded that to exempt Reb Realty "might well insulate a significant credit market from the Act."s5 However, the statutory
and regulatory definitions of a "creditor" do not provide for a determination of the issue on the basis of the market affected. If Congress had been
concerned with inclusion of the various credit markets, it could have
required disclosure in all instances where credit is extended. Surely the
court would not require homeowners selling their homes on contract to
comply with the Act on the ground that to do otherwise would "insulate
a significant credit market from the Act. "36 Exclusion of significant
credit markets, then, is not a sufficiently compelling public policy basis
for the court's decision.
A more justifiable position for the court would have been to review the
individual lender's expertise and familiarity with the Act's requirements.
These facts are crucial regardless of whether the lender is a business or
private lender.37 Each alleged creditor is entitled to equal consideration
letter which indicates that a corporation is not a creditor within the meaning of the Act when
it makes incidental loans to its officers and directors; dollar amounts of the loans are not considered. FTC Letter, August 1, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE
TI 30,329.
33495 F.2d at 650.
supra note 18, at 13-14. Only when a broker ar3412 C.F.R. 5 226.2(f) (1974); ABRAHAM,
ranges credit for a fee or participates with the lender in the preparation of credit documents
must he disclose. Even if he should arrange credit for a homeowner he is exempted from the
requirements of the Act because an "arranger" must arrange credit for a "creditor."
35495 F.2d at 650.
3

~

.

s7An initial problem is determining a point of separation between the business sector and
the private sector. How many transactions by a private individual are sufficient to place him
in the business sector? T h e same problem exists under the tax laws; those engaged in business
are entitled to ordinary business deductions including bad debt losses under INT.REV.CODEOF
1954, $5 165, 166; see, e.g., Mercer v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967) (intent of
taxpayer determinative of whether carrying on trade or business); Hickerson v. Commissioner,
229 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1956) (determination of business loss dependent upon relation loss
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of the facts relevant to its situation.38 In this case the court did not have
sufficient factual basis for its conclusion that Reb Realty "likely" had
knowledge of the Act's requirements. Remanding the case to the district
court for findings on this point would have been appropriate.

B. Remedies
With the creditor issue resolved against Reb Realty, the court next
reviewed the propriety of the lower court's award of both rescission and
damages. The problem of selecting appropriate remedies is inherent in
the Truth in Lending Act because it fails to define the interrelation of
rescission and damages.39 The court in the instant case, reviewing the
election of remedies doctrine,40 concluded that the two remedies were
not inconsistent and that the award of both rescission and damages was a
proper exercise of the district court's discretionary power.41
1. Rescission. The Act provides for the rescission upon demand, with
certain exceptions, within 3 days of consummation of a transaction when
a security interest in any residential real property is obtained or acq ~ i r e d An
.~~
examination of the legislative history shows that rescission
was a hasty addition to the Truth in Lending Act. This provision first
appeared after a joint Senate and House conference to resolve differences
between the Senate and House versions of the Act." Its predecessor, introduced by Representative Cahill, required disclosure of credit terms 3
days before consummation when secured transactions involved resibears to trade or business); First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 141 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ("isolated" or "occasional" activities do not constitute a business). This approach under the internal Revenue Code suggests that all expenses, even those of a business, are not "business"
expenses allowable under the Code. It is arguable that a lender need not fall within the
"creditor" definition until he has also engaged in a business under the Internal Revenue
Code. T h e Truth in Lending Act is concerned with different issues but the Act does recognize
that a creditor need not be a "creditor" within the Act for all his transactions. FRB Letter No.
161, October 17, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE7 30,190. As
courts weigh relevant factors under the Internal Revenue Code, so should they weigh factors
under the Truth in Lending Act. See Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of
Coverage, 24 STAN.L. REV.793,823-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Larmore] .
38Warren & Larmore at 823-24 (suggesting expertise and familiarity should be considered
in determining the "creditor" issue). But c j FRB Letter No. 261, February 19, 1970, [19691974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE7 30, 313.
39See Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lending Act: T h e Relationship
Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IOWAL. REV. 199 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as PriL. REV.573. A similar problem arises under state versions of
vate Remedies] ; 1971 TOLEDO
the UNIFORM
CONSUMER
CREDITCODE. Generally the rescission and damage sections of the
Truth in Lending Act were adopted by the UCCC verbatim. Consequently the Code also fails
to define the interrelation between the two provisions. See e.g., IDAHO
CODEANN.$8 28-35-203
to -204 (Supp. 5A 1974); UTAHCODEANN.$8 70B-5-203to -204 (Supp. 7B 1973).
40See note 10 supra.
4l495 F.2d at 652.
4215 U.S.C. 8 1635(a) (1970);see note 6 supra.
43H.R. REP. NO. 1397,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1968).
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dential real property.44 Cahill intended the provision to end "vicious
secondary mortgage s~hemes"~5
by allowing the consumer additional
time to contemplate the seriousness of the obligations to be undertaken
in these transactions.
The House adoption of Cahill's proposal indicates concern for the
consumer in residential real property transactions, but there is nothing
to explain why the joint conference adopted the right of rescission instead.46 There are, however, two logical reasons for the conference
change. First, consumers under Cahill's proposal were given 3 days prior
to consummation of a transaction in which to consider the terms disclosed. This was to be accomplished in the privacy and unhurried atmosphere of the consumer's home. Yet, the pressures of zealous salesmen
might still exist in this setting. In contrast, the Act presently provides the
right to rescind for 3 days after the transaction is completed. Without the
continued influence and possible harassment of a salesman, a consumer
is much more likely to give the transaction the serious thought it deserves. This is most effectively encouraged by the present rescission section. Second, many consumers, even if not pressured by sales tactics,
never fully realize the consequences of their acts until those acts are completed and the first payment is imminent. Only then do they carefully
consider what they have done. The 3-day right of rescission provides
time for reconsideration.
Legislative concern for the consumer's rights, reflected in the hastily
added right of rescission, strongly suggests that the section is remedial in
nature. This conclusion is bolstered when the effects of rescission are
considered. The consumer is no longer liable under the agreement and
receives all money and property previously conveyed to the credit0r.~7
There are punitive characteristics within the rescission section, however. As long as a creditor fails to disclose according to the Act's requirements, rescission is available to the debtor.48 Most interpretations of the
, rescission section indicate there is no statute of limitationsY49
so that if
proper disclosure is not made, rescission conceivably could be had at any
44114 CONG.&c. 1610-11 ( 1 968) (remarks of Representative Cahill).
451d. at 161 1.
4 6 B ~see
t K. XlcLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW.199, 206
(1968) (suggesting enactment of recent door-to-door sales acts influenced the change).
"15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970); see note 6 supra.
4 ~ .
49See FRB Letter KO. 362, June 29, 1970, [1969-19'74 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.
GUIDEll 30,424; FRB Letter No. 235, January 30, 1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
CONS.CRED.GUIDEll 30,268; FRB Letter No. 219, December 30, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH CONS.CRED.GUIDE7 30,245; see Aldridge, supra note 4, at 448. But see Wachtel
v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.), eel-t. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1 973) (suggesting laches and
supra note 18, at 5 14.8 [4] (suggesting
estoppel may be interposed as defenses); ABRAHAM,
state statutes of limitation may apply).
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time in the future. In addition, if a creditor fails to act on the consumer's
proper demand for rescission, the creditor will forfeit his property without compensation from the consumer.50 In such a situation the consumer is the recipient of a windfall, and the creditor is penalized for failure to comply with the rescission section. But as long as the creditor does
not disregard his duties under the Act, the remedial characteristics of the
section are more significant than the penal characteristics.
2. Damages. Civil damages may be imposed for failure to comply with
the Act's disclosure requirements.S1 The legislative history shows that
the civil liability section of the Act was contemplated by both Houses of
Congress prior to adoption of the final bill. This history provides some
aid to interpreting this section.
Under the Senate version of the Act, primary enforcement of the Act's
requirements was to be accomplished by institution of private civil actions under authority of the civil liability section. Creditors who failed
to disclose, as required by the Act, would be subject to the "penalty" of
this section.s2 In contrast, the House version anticipated that many unsophisticated consumers would not be provided adequate protection
under the Act except through administrative enforcement. As a result,
the House version provided that primary enforcement of the Act was to
be accomplished by various federal agencies,53with secondary enforcement coming from the civil liability section.54 Recoveries under the
House version of the civil liability section were also classified as "penalties. "55
As a result of this joint concern for effective enforcement, the Act, as
adopted, provides for both administrative and private enforcement.56
Thus enactment of the civil liability section was to provide a further
deterrent to those seeking to avoid the disclosure requirements of the
This concern for enforcement of the Act, rather than for compensation of injured consumers, suggests that the civil liability section is
penal in nature rather than remedial.
Other characteristics of the section also indicate its penal nature.
These include its arbitrary minimum and maximum limits for recovery,
use of a double multiple to compute amount of recovery, the defenses
provided by the section, the provisions allowing recovery of attorney's

5015 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970).
5l15 U.S.C. 5 1640(a) (1970); see note 5 supra.
5%. REP.NO.392,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967).
53Primary enforcement was to be accomplished primarily through fines and imprisonment.
54H.R. REP.NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1967).
5jId. at 19.
5615U.S.C. $5 1607, 1640 (1970).
57SeePrivate Remedies, supra note 39, at 209.
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fees to encourage actions under its provisions, and finally, its lack of relation to actual consumer damage.58
There are, nevertheless, remedial characteristics in the section.59
These characteristics are more apparent if discussed in a context where
rescission is not available as a remedy. Where the'tivil liability section is
the only section providing a recovery for violations of the Act, part of the
recovery may offset actual damages. But since proof of actual damage is
not necessary for recovery under the Act, the argument that the section
is remedial becomes weak.60 Indeed, in view of its legislative classification, its purpose, and its characteristics, it appears the civil liability section's penal nature far outweighs its remedial nature.
3. Remedy application. The court in the instant case concluded that
the rescission and civil liability sections are not mutually exclusive and
that a consumer should not be required to elect between the two. In
Bostwick the district court observed: "It is possible, of course, to view the
civil liability section of the Act as being punitive in nature rather than
remedial. Such a view would lead to the conclusion that the election of
remedies concept had no application . . . ."G1 This view is strongly supported by the Supreme Court's classification of damages under the civil
liability section as a civil penalty.62 Thus the Ninth Circuit's affirmation
of the district court's award appears well founded.63
T h e court, however, added a caveat for future cases: [W] e think a
request for both forms of relief is addressed to a court's sense of equity
and may properly be denied in appropriate cases. "64 The court was concerned with the harshness that might result from recoveries under both
the rescission and damage sections and agreed that an award of both
would not be appropriate in all instance^.^^
There are at least two situations where an award of both remedies
might be inappropriate. They are directly related to the rescission section and its two punitive characteristics previously discussedd66 First,
rescission is available indefinitely if the Act's requirements of disclosure
are not met.67 Certainly over a period of time the harshness of granting
rescission against a creditor increases. If the period between consumma"

58See id. at 208-09; 1971 TOLEDO
L. REV.573,581-84.
59SeePrivate Remedies, supra note 39, at 208-09; 197 1 TOLEDO
L. REV.573, 581-84.
6oSee 197 1 TOLEDO
L. REV.573,580.
61319F. Supp. at 877.
62Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 41 1 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1973).
63See Griffith, Truth-in-Lending and Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHION.L.
REV.1, 15-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Griffith] ; Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 214;
197 1 TOLEDO
L. REV.573,584-85.
64495 F.2d at 652.
651d.
66See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
6715 U.S.C. $ 1635(a) (1970); see note 6 supra.
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tion and rescission is great, an award of damages may indeed be unduly
burdensome. Second, if a creditor fails to take the necessary steps to
effectuate the consumer's rescission, the consumer is allowed to keep the
property without obligation.68 In such a case an additional award of
damages may actually subject a creditor to two penalties; the caveat seeks
to avoid this result.
Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, stated in Palmer v.
Wilson: " [He] would limit the court's equitable discretion [to refuse a
monetary award] to cases where a civil penalty would be an inequitable
windfall to an overreaching [consumer] ."69 T h e two previous examples
would fall within this category.
Allowing courts this discretionary power will have little effect upon
the Act. The creditor is deterred in any event. He must disclose according to the Act's requirements, for a court would surely award penalties
regardless of any resulting harshness if he deliberately fails to disclose.
The ever-present threat of both sanctions insures creditor adherence to
the Act; without this threat rescission might not be sufficient to enforce
disclosure compliance.70

Criminal Procedure - PAROLEREVOCATION
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DOUBLE
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PRINCIPLES
- Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,
5 18 P.2d 721 (1974).

THE

Daryl Standlee, a Washington State parolee,' was charged with abduction, assault, attempted rape, and molesting a minor. Proceedings to
suspend his parole began following the charges but were stayed pending
a criminal trial. Even though Standlee was acquitted at trial on an alibi
defense, the prison authorities, considering the same evidence, ruled he
had violated his parole and revoked it. The only factual issue in either
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Standlee sought a writ of
habeas corpus, contending that collateral estoppel2 prevented the reliti6815 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970). This result was reached in Sosa v . Fite, 498 F . 2d 114 (5th Cir.
1974), where 2 years after siding was installed on a consumer's residence the consumer was
allowed to rescind the transaction because disclosure of credit terms had not been made. Because of the creditor's failure to effectuate rescission the consumer was allowed to keep the
siding without obligation. In addition, it should be noted that the consumer was awarded
attorney's fees even though the rescission section of the Act does not provide for them.
69502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Judge Wright, concurring in part and dissenting i n
part). Judge Wright dissented from the majority conclusion that a court could condition
rescission on repayment by a debtor. He stated the right to rescind was unconditional.
'Osee Boyd at 182-83;Griffith at 16-17;Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 207.
'Standlee's prior conviction was for rape. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at
iv, Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,518 P.2d 721 (1974).
2

Res Judicata necessitates an identity of causes of action, while the invocation of collateral
estoppel does not. . . . Where there is a second action between the parties, or their privies,

